Norman Finkelstein: The Crisis of International Law and the Test of Gaza

Norman Finkelstein: The Crisis of International Law and the Test of Gaza

In the televised interview under discussion, Professor Norman Finkelstein, a scholar and author critical of Israeli policies, raises a fundamental question that extends beyond the war in Gaza and even beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: If international institutions were established to prevent atrocities, enforce the law, and protect the rights of nations, why do they appear so powerless when these responsibilities become more urgent than ever?

In this conversation, Finkelstein does not limit himself to condemning Israel’s military actions or criticizing the policies of Western governments. He examines the very structures that were supposed to prevent the recurrence of historical catastrophes, including the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the international legal system. His central question is whether justice can genuinely exist when existing legal rules, rather than becoming instruments of practical action, remain confined to diplomatic statements and political declarations.

This is precisely where Finkelstein’s arguments become significant. He moves the audience beyond emotional reactions to images of destruction and civilian suffering, inviting them to examine political responsibility, legal contradictions, and the role of ordinary people in changing the balance of power.

From his perspective, the catastrophe in Gaza is not merely the result of decisions made by one government or the actions of one military establishment. It is also a test of the international order—an order that has largely based its legitimacy on the claim that the law must prevail over power, but now faces the question of whether it is willing to uphold that principle against its own powerful allies.

1. Finkelstein’s Central Criticism: International Law Must Not Be Reduced to Diplomatic Formalities

One of the most important parts of the interview is Finkelstein’s discussion of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, dated November 17, 2025. He regards this resolution as a deeply troubling development and argues that the framework it establishes for governing Gaza’s future sidelines the long history of resolutions and legal principles associated with the Palestinian question.

To explain his criticism, Finkelstein points to the usual structure of United Nations resolutions. Such resolutions generally begin with introductory paragraphs referring to previous documents, relevant resolutions, and the legal history of a particular dispute. In his view, the omission of this context from the resolution in question is not merely an administrative or stylistic change; it could have significant political and legal consequences.

He fears that, under this framework, Gaza is treated not as part of the broader question of Palestinian territory and the rights of its people, but as an issue to be managed politically by foreign powers. Finkelstein compares this situation to the imperial logic of the past, when great powers made decisions about territories without placing the will and rights of their inhabitants at the center of the process.

Regardless of the final assessment of the resolution’s legal implications, the question he raises remains fundamental: Can decisions about the future of a society be made without placing the political rights, sovereignty, and will of its people at the center of the decision-making process?

This question is particularly important in the case of Gaza. Rebuilding homes, providing food and medicine, and restoring public services are all essential. However, none of these measures can replace the right to self-determination. If the future of a territory is designed without the genuine participation of its people, there is a risk that reconstruction will create a new form of managing the same conditions of domination rather than bringing them to an end.

Through this approach, Finkelstein directs attention to the distinction between “crisis management” and “resolving the problem.” Crisis management may alleviate some of the humanitarian consequences, but resolving the problem requires confronting its underlying political and legal causes.

Defending his position in this regard does not mean accepting every legal assessment he makes without question. Rather, it means taking seriously the demand he puts forward: No political plan should become an excuse for disregarding the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people.

2. Why Does Finkelstein Insist on Enforcing the Law?

Perhaps the most practical and important part of the interview is Finkelstein’s emphasis on one simple and clear demand: “Enforce the law.”

In discussing the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory, he emphasizes that the issue should not remain trapped indefinitely in an endless cycle of negotiations.

Finkelstein argues that if an international judicial body has concluded that the occupation is unlawful, the political response should not consist merely of repeating calls for dialogue or inviting the parties to begin yet another round of negotiations. The next question should be how to translate legal obligations into practical action.

In his view, the main problem is not a shortage of official statements. It is the gap between declaring a position and enforcing it.

Governments may speak about human rights, describe settlement construction as illegal, or express concern about possible war crimes. But if these positions do not lead to policies proportionate to their legal obligations, what impact will they have on the actual conditions faced by people on the ground?

Finkelstein calls on the anti-war movement and the broader movement for justice to make their demand clear: enforce the law and hold those who violate it accountable. He believes that if governments are genuinely committed to international law, they must also be prepared to accept the practical consequences of that commitment.

Within this framework, he points to the possibility of imposing sanctions if legal obligations continue to be violated. The logic is straightforward: If the law is enforced only against weaker states or the political adversaries of powerful countries, it cannot be regarded as a neutral and universal system.

This is the contradiction Finkelstein seeks to expose. The legitimacy of international law depends on ensuring that its rules are not applied only to enemies and political rivals, but are taken equally seriously when they concern allies.

Of course, a distinction must be made between advisory opinions of the Court, its binding judgments, and the political decisions of governments. Demanding the enforcement of international law requires a precise understanding of the nature of each legal decision and the obligations arising from it. Nevertheless, this distinction does not diminish the importance of Finkelstein’s fundamental question: If governments speak about the rule of law, why should its enforcement be postponed indefinitely?

3. Political Opportunity: Why Should We Not Surrender Everything to Pessimism?

In another part of the interview, Finkelstein adopts a particularly interesting position. Despite his sharp criticism of Western policies and the performance of international institutions, he argues that political opportunities should not be dismissed, even when there is little reason to trust politicians.

The discussion centers on Ed Miliband’s remarks about placing British policy within the framework of international law. Finkelstein highlights three aspects of those remarks: the illegality of settlements, the acceptance of the International Court of Justice’s 2024 advisory opinion on the occupation, and the willingness to leave open the possibility of recognizing Israel’s legal responsibility if genocide is established by the competent judicial authority.

From Finkelstein’s perspective, the significance of these statements lies in their potential to provide a basis for demanding more concrete action. He does not claim that such statements, by themselves, guarantee a change in British policy. On the contrary, he remains skeptical about Miliband’s political motivations and makes clear that he does not intend to place his trust in him personally.

Yet this skepticism does not lead Finkelstein to political disengagement.

His argument is that even if a politician has adopted a new position for electoral reasons or under pressure from public opinion, social movements can use that position to advance their own demands. The question is not whether the politician can be fully trusted; it is whether society can compel him to honor his promises.

This is one of the strengths of Finkelstein’s political thinking. He distinguishes between trusting those in power and taking advantage of contradictions in their positions. A social movement does not need to agree with every view held by a politician in order to support one specific commitment and demand that it be implemented.

For this reason, Finkelstein urges activists to maintain and intensify public pressure and force politicians to act on their words.

This message is particularly important for movements supporting Palestinian rights. If governments have been compelled to change their language and positions under public pressure, the movements’ withdrawal could allow them to return to previous policies without facing political consequences.

From Finkelstein’s perspective, therefore, skepticism toward power must be accompanied by political organization. Skepticism without action leads to surrender; skepticism combined with public pressure can become a means of holding those in power accountable.

4. Critiquing the Peace Process: Why Should Palestinian Rights Be Negotiable?

Another section of the interview focuses on Finkelstein’s criticism of the return to old negotiating frameworks. He argues that mainstream political discourse sometimes turns issues that have already been addressed within international law into subjects for renewed bargaining.

He refers to the status of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, as well as the issue of Israeli settlements. In his view, if the principle that territory cannot lawfully be acquired through war is accepted, along with the legal assessment of the occupation, it should not be presented as though every issue remains dependent on a political agreement between the parties.

Within this framework, Finkelstein rejects the assumption that any future settlement must necessarily begin with renewed negotiations over borders, the status of East Jerusalem, or the number of settlers who might be permitted to remain. He argues that political negotiations must not become a substitute for fulfilling legal obligations.

This criticism addresses one of the fundamental problems with peace processes: Sometimes the negotiating process itself becomes the goal, and its continuation is treated as a measure of success rather than the achievement of justice.

Yet a peace arrangement in which one side continues to enjoy military power, territorial control, or political superiority, while the other must engage in endless negotiations to secure its basic rights, raises serious questions about justice and the balance of power.

In this interview, Finkelstein emphasizes that Palestinian rights should not be reduced to concessions granted at the end of a diplomatic process. From his perspective, the law must establish the framework for negotiations and political decision-making rather than become another subject for bargaining.

This position does not mean rejecting all dialogue. Rather, it means that dialogue cannot replace the enforcement of the law. Negotiations can contribute to a lasting peace only when they are grounded in the fundamental rights of the people, rather than treating the very existence of those rights as an open question.

5. Political Responsibility, Freedom of Expression, and the Need for Accountability

Throughout the interview, Finkelstein addresses the role of political and media pressure in limiting criticism of Israeli policies. He refers to controversies surrounding allegations of antisemitism within the British Labour Party and pressure directed at critics of Israeli government policies.

His argument is that accusations of antisemitism must not be turned into a tool for silencing legitimate criticism of the Israeli government or its policies. At the same time, he explicitly states that he is not claiming that every allegation of antisemitism is fabricated. His criticism concerns what he views as the instrumental and exaggerated use of such accusations.

This distinction is essential. Combating genuine antisemitism is a serious responsibility. However, that responsibility must not become a pretext for preventing scrutiny of governments, criticism of military policies, or discussion of the conduct of political organizations and influential institutions.

Likewise, criticizing a government or organization does not, in itself, justify holding every member of a religious or ethnic group responsible. Responsibility must be assessed on the basis of specific actions, decisions, forms of support, and evidence relating to each individual or institution.

From this perspective, defending freedom of expression does not mean shielding anyone from criticism. On the contrary, freedom of expression becomes meaningful when people can question the conduct of those in power, political institutions, and influential organizations without having the mere act of raising questions treated as grounds for exclusion.

In his discussion of international institutions, Finkelstein also calls for investigations into corruption and conduct that, in his view, has undermined their credibility. In his book, Gaza’s Gravediggers: An Inquiry into Corruption in High Places, he critically examines the conduct of certain figures and international organizations.

During the interview, he makes specific criticisms concerning Pramila Patten’s role in advancing allegations related to sexual violence, as well as the conduct of International Court of Justice judge Julia Sebutinde. These are Finkelstein’s allegations and assessments; an independent judgment on each case requires examining the relevant documents and evidence.

Nevertheless, the underlying principle he advances is defensible: Institutions that demand accountability from others must also be prepared to answer legitimate questions about their own conduct. The credibility of a judicial or human rights institution is measured not by its official title, but by its independence, transparency, professional standards, and commitment to applying consistent criteria.

6. Changing Public Opinion: An Achievement That Must Not Be Underestimated

One of the most encouraging parts of the interview is Finkelstein’s analysis of changing public opinion regarding Gaza.

He explains that during the early stages of the war, openly supporting the people of Gaza could carry political costs for some politicians and activists. In his assessment, however, this situation changed in parts of society in subsequent years. In some cases, supporting the people of Gaza became not an obstacle to political activity, but a factor that helped increase public support.

To illustrate the depth of this shift, Finkelstein refers to polls that, according to him, indicated that approximately 30 to 40 percent of American Jews believed Israel was committing genocide in Gaza. This figure is presented in the interview as his account of polling data. Its precise accuracy requires identifying the specific surveys, their dates, methodologies, and wording.

With that qualification, Finkelstein’s central point is clear: Public opinion is neither fixed nor unchangeable. Even in societies that have been influenced for years by particular political and media narratives, witnessing events, accessing information, and engaging in sustained social activism can change public perceptions.

This shift has political significance because politicians, contrary to the image of their power as absolute, depend on electoral support, public legitimacy, and the balance of social forces.

Finkelstein believes that public pressure in Britain and the United States has influenced the positions of some politicians. He draws from this the conclusion that continued civic and political engagement matters and that changes in public opinion should not be dismissed as insignificant.

This argument does not mean that changing public attitudes alone can end an occupation or achieve justice. Changes in public opinion produce tangible results only when they translate into organization, public demands, and pressure for policy change.

Nevertheless, generating such pressure becomes more difficult without a shift in public opinion. For this reason, Finkelstein sees this change as an opportunity that must be seized.

7. Finkelstein Against Absolute Pessimism: From Anger to Political Action

Perhaps the most important message of the interview can be understood through Finkelstein’s rejection of two opposing approaches: naive optimism about those in power and absolute pessimism that dismisses every possibility of change in advance.

He neither places unconditional trust in politicians nor asks his audience to rely on diplomatic promises. Instead, he proposes that every change in official positions should become an opportunity to demand concrete action.

If a government declares that it supports international law, it should be pressed to enforce that law. If a politician speaks of accountability, he should be asked to specify what measures will be taken to achieve it. If an institution claims to defend human rights, it should explain why existing mechanisms have not been used to protect those rights in specific cases.

This approach moves politics beyond slogans and toward measurable outcomes. It is no longer sufficient for governments to describe themselves as defenders of peace; their actions must be assessed against the standards they publicly proclaim.

Finkelstein also emphasizes the importance of reaching audiences that do not necessarily share his views. Explaining his appearance on Tucker Carlson’s program, he says he is willing to speak to any audience, provided he is given the opportunity to speak and is not censored. His goal, from this perspective, is not necessarily to persuade his interlocutor, but to reach people who have not yet made up their minds.

This position reflects a pragmatic understanding of political dialogue. If the goal is to change public opinion, restricting discussion to groups that already agree with one another limits the potential for influence. Appearing on different media platforms can provide opportunities to present arguments to new audiences.

Of course, this strategy is effective only when a genuine opportunity for dialogue exists and the speaker’s arguments can be presented without serious distortion or censorship. Finkelstein explicitly acknowledges this condition.

In this respect, his remarks represent more than a defense of a particular position on Palestine. They also defend the importance of reasoned argument, public debate, and efforts to break through political and media barriers.

Conclusion: Enforce the Law and Hold Those in Power Accountable

Professor Norman Finkelstein’s interview presents a critical assessment of the state of international law and the response of global institutions to the catastrophe in Gaza. He argues that the problem is not simply a lack of laws or an absence of official statements. The central problem is the gap between declared principles and practical action.

From his perspective, if the illegality of the occupation, the need to respect Palestinian rights, and the principle of accountability are acknowledged, these principles must also be reflected in the actual policies of governments. Repeating calls for negotiations, issuing statements, and expressing concern cannot, by themselves, deliver justice without effective mechanisms for enforcing legal obligations.

The importance of Finkelstein’s arguments also lies in the fact that, despite his deep skepticism toward structures of power, he does not encourage his audience to withdraw from the political arena. On the contrary, he believes that political developments, even when limited or motivated by mixed interests, can create opportunities to advance public demands.

His message to anti-war movements and supporters of Palestinian rights is clear: Do not place unconditional trust in politicians, but do not allow their words to remain without consequences either. If they speak of the law, demand its enforcement. If they speak of accountability, demand genuine accountability. And if they claim to uphold human rights, judge their actions by those same standards.

This position turns defending Finkelstein into something greater than supporting an academic figure. In this context, defending his arguments means defending the right to question power, the need for accountability within international institutions, and the principle that the rights of a people must not be subordinated to the political interests of powerful governments.

Ultimately, the central message of the interview can be summarized in one demand: Enforce the law—not only when doing so serves the interests of the powerful, but especially when enforcing it requires holding them accountable.

Justice becomes a political reality rather than a moral ideal when citizens, social movements, and independent institutions refuse to allow official commitments to remain mere words. From Finkelstein’s perspective, the future of this struggle depends not on naive trust in power, but on awareness, organization, and sustained pressure to compel those in power to act in accordance with their own obligations.